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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1502 
 ___________ 
 
 CARLOS ZUNIGA HERNANDEZ, 
         Appellant 
 v. 
 
 UNKNOWN OFFICER; OFFICER ARENAS; LT. SPELLER 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00332) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Jurisdictional Defect or  
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 5, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 





PER CURIAM  
 Carlos Zuniga Hernandez filed suit pro se and in forma pauperis against one 
unknown and two named correctional officers at the federal prison where he is an inmate.  
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The United States Marshals Service served process on the named defendants and the 
United States.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c),(e), & (i).  Based on allegations described more 
fully by the District Court, Zuniga Hernandez claimed that the defendants violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights because (1) the unknown officer failed to protect him after he 
informed him of an attempted rape on January 9, 2009; (2) when Zuniga Hernandez was 
brought up on disciplinary charges for fighting with the inmate who allegedly attempted 
to rape him, Officer Arenas lied by denying that Zuniga Hernandez had reported “sexual 
approaches” by the other inmate (saying instead that Zuniga Hernandez had stated that he 
was having problems with another inmate but offered no specifics); and (3) Lieutenant 
Soeller failed to respond to Zuniga Hernadez‟s reports of two attempted rapes and an 
attempted theft committed by the other inmate.   
 The named defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for 
summary judgment.  The District Court, adopting the Magistrate Judge‟s report and 
recommendation and overruling Zuniga Hernandez‟s objections, dismissed the complaint 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  The District Court also 
denied Zuniga Hernandez‟s motion to amend the complaint, concluding that amendment 
would be futile.  In the same order, the District Court remanded the matter to the 
Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.  In doing so, the District Court was considering 
the Magistrate Judge‟s earlier order which gave Zuniga Hernandez additional time to 
identify the unnamed defendant in the complaint.  Zuniga Hernandez appeals from the 
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District Court‟s order.  
 The first issue is whether we have jurisdiction over Zuniga Hernandez‟s appeal 
despite the pending claims against the unknown defendant, which the District Court 
remanded to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.  Although the remand was 
entirely proper, see Estate of Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (holding that “an action may proceed against a party whose name is unknown 
if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity of the party to 
be ascertained after reasonable discovery”), it does not divest us of jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 For jurisdiction to attach under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, a judgment must be final as to 
all parties, all causes of action, and the whole subject-matter.  See Andrews v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963) (citing Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920)); Mellon 
Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 640 (3d Cir. 1991).  In actions 
involving multiple claims and parties, a district court may direct the entry of final 
judgment on fewer than all of the claims and parties on the express determination that 
there is no just reason for delay.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (explaining the requisite 
determination under the rule); Gomez v. Gov‟t of the Virgin Islands, 882 F.2d 733, 736 
(3d Cir. V.I. 1989).  Although there was no Rule 54(b) certification in this case, we still 
have jurisdiction over this appeal because a defendant who has not been served is not a 
“party” within the meaning of Rule 54(b).  Id.; see also United States v. Studivant, 529 
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F.2d 673, 674 n.2 (3d Cir. 1976).  The only claims that the District Court did not 
adjudicate were those claims against the unserved, unnamed defendant.
1
   
 Concluding that we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we exercise plenary 
review over the dismissal of Zuniga Hernandez‟s complaint, and we review the denial of 
leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  See Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  On review, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s judgment because 
no substantial issue is presented on appeal.  See Local Rule 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
 The District Court properly dismissed the complaint against the two named 
defendants for failure to state a claim.  The Eighth Amendment, which guards against 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” in prison, see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 
312, 319 (1986) (citation omitted), has been interpreted to include protection against 
“„violence at the hands of other prisoners,‟” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 
(1994).  However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that 
translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim‟s 
safety.”  Id. at 834.  Nonetheless, when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to a 
substantial risk of a serious harm, the Eighth Amendment is violated.  Id. at 836.  The 
harm must be “objectively, „sufficiently serious.‟”  Id. at 834.  A prison official is 
deliberately indifferent to the risk of that harm when he or she “knows of and disregards 
                                                 
1
 We note that it appears that Zuniga Hernandez has made no effort since the District 
Court‟s ruling to identify the unnamed defendant.  Also, in response to our notice of 
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an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from 
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 
must also draw the inference.”  Id. at 837.  For example, a prison official could be said to 
have knowledge of the risk in a case where the “plaintiff presents evidence showing that 
a substantial risk of inmate attacks was „longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or 
expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the 
defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and 
thus “must have known” about it.‟”  Id. at 842.   
 As the District Court concluded, Zuniga Hernandez did not meet the standard 
based on his allegations.  Assuming Zuniga Hernandez showed that he faced a serious 
risk of harm, he did not show that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to it.  
Based on his allegations, the defendants took measures to protect him.  Zuniga 
Hernandez alleged that as soon as he reported the attempted theft and the two alleged 
sexual assaults in the shower, Arenas sent the accused inmate to another housing unit to 
see Soeller, separated the inmates within one housing unit, and stated that he would talk 
with the accused inmate himself.  Soeller also talked to Zuniga Hernandez and assured 
him that the accused inmate was not to come into Zuniga Hernandez‟s space to bother 
him anymore.  Although the other inmate subsequently entered Hernadez‟s cell and 
struck and kicked him (which led to a fight in which both parties were injured), Arenas 
                                                                                                                                                             
possible dismissal for jurisdictional defect, he states that the District Court‟s order 
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and Soeller made reasonable efforts to protect Zuniga Hernandez from the risk of harm 
under the circumstances described in the complaint.   
 Zuniga Hernandez also did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
based on his allegation that Arenas gave a false statement at the disciplinary hearing 
following the fight between Zuniga Hernandez and the other inmate.  Despite Zuniga 
Hernandez‟s claim to the contrary, the allegedly false statement was not an example of 
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.  See, generally, Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 832-36.  To the extent that his allegation implicates due process concerns 
(assuming a protected liberty interest), he explains in his complaint how due process was 
satisfied - he had an opportunity to be heard and defend against the allegedly falsified 
evidence at his disciplinary hearing.  See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  In any event, to the extent that he brought the claim of a false statement to 
recover good time credits lost as a result of his disciplinary hearing, his claim is barred by 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).  See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 
646-47 (1997).    
 In short, the District Court properly dismissed Zuniga Hernandez‟s complaint 
against the named defendants.  The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in 
denying leave to amend as futile.  In his proposed amendment, Zuniga Hernandez  
                                                                                                                                                             
resolved all of his claims and issues before the District Court.   
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presented essentially the same allegations (although he wished to add two more 
defendants to the suit).  For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.  
